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Comments
Feres: The “Double-edged Sword”
Kaitlan Price*
ABSTRACT
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court barred service
members from suing the Government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act if the injuries occurred “incident to military service.”
In establishing this doctrine, the Court discussed the necessity of
protecting the military from lawsuits to ensure effective decision-
making by military leaders.
Scholars have harshly criticized Feres in the modern era, ar-
guing Feres must be overturned to provide service members with
a greater opportunity for recovery.  Specifically, many scholars
admonish Feres because the Supreme Court failed to provide a
clear definition of “incident to military service.”  Lacking a clear
definition of “incident to military service,” Feres has transformed
into a blanket waiver of all military tort claims against the Gov-
ernment.  This broad interpretation has led to the denial of jus-
tice to numerous soldiers throughout the country.
In May 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to con-
sider Daniel v. United States, where plaintiff asked the Court to
overturn Feres.  After the Supreme Court declined to hear
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to Jack Kerwin for providing me with necessary encouragement throughout writing
this Comment.  Thank you to Tessa Shurr for the endless assistance with this Com-
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Daniel, it became evident that the Court has no intention of ever
completely overturning the doctrine.  Congress passed the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act in December 2019, allowing
service members to file claims with the Department of Defense
for medical malpractice injuries caused by the Government.
While this exception is considered a victory, Feres remains a
blockade to service members attempting to recover for non-med-
ical tort claims through a court of law.  This Comment will rec-
ommend the Supreme Court establish a consistent approach to
defining “incident to military service” for the lower courts to
apply.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the ‘wide-
spread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”1  Since the doc-
trine’s creation in 1950, Feres’s bar on recovery for service members
who incur injuries “incident to military service” provides the Gov-
ernment with a broad protection from tort lawsuits.2  In practice,
Feres effectively shields the Government from lawsuits by service
members wrongfully injured at the hands of the military.3
In the modern era, Feres receives harsh criticism by service
members, families of military personnel, and numerous scholars—
all asking the Supreme Court to reconsider and overturn the doc-
trine.4 Feres’s opponents argue the doctrine produces unjust results
by creating a blanket waiver denying service members recovery for
injuries that did not directly occur “incident to military service.”5
Because Feres receives extensive criticism, the Supreme Court must
correct the doctrine’s inadequacies to address the years of injustice
inflicted on injured service members.6
Part II of this Comment will examine the history of the Feres
doctrine.7  This section will discuss the demise of sovereign immu-
nity, which has permitted private citizens to sue the Government
1. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. See Andrew D. Popper, Comment, Rethinking Feres: Granting Access to
Justice for Service Members, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1491, 1505–06 (2019).
3. See id.
4. See infra Section II.C.1.
5. See infra Section II.C.2.
6. See Popper, supra note 2, at 1499.
7. See infra Part II.
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for tort injuries.8  Next, this Comment will discuss the Supreme
Court’s creation of Feres’s “incident to military service” test and the
rationales behind the doctrine’s existence.9  Further, this section
will introduce the shortcomings and condemnations of the Feres
doctrine in the modern era.10
Part III of this Comment will begin by examining the most re-
cent attempts to solve Feres’s inadequacies, in both the Supreme
Court and Congress.11  Next, this Comment will discuss why the Su-
preme Court cannot completely overturn the Feres doctrine in the
modern era.12  Because Feres remains necessary for military disci-
pline and effectiveness, Part III will recommend the Supreme Court
define Feres’s “incident to military service” test consistently for the
lower courts to apply.13  This Comment will propose that the Su-
preme Court adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s three-factor balancing
test to define “incident to military service.”14
By examining the duty status of the injured service member,
the location where the service member’s injury occurred, and
“whether the service member’s injuries resulted from following mil-
itary orders or compulsion,” the Eleventh Circuit’s test will provide
lower courts with a clear, consistent approach to defining “incident
to military service.”15  Further, the Eleventh Circuit’s test will en-
sure lower courts examine each case on a factual basis instead of
utilizing Feres as a blanket waiver for all military tort claims.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Granting Citizens
the Right to Sue the Federal Government
1. Sovereign Immunity
Prior to 1946, the doctrine of sovereign immunity reigned su-
preme throughout the United States under the theory “the king can
do no wrong.”17  In practice, sovereign immunity provided the Gov-
ernment with an almost complete protection from private citizens’
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. See infra Section II.B.
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section III.A.
12. See infra Section III.B.
13. See infra Section III.C.
14. See infra Section III.C.
15. See infra Section III.C.
16. See infra Section III.C.
17. Popper, supra note 2, at 1493.
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civil tort lawsuits.18  Throughout the United States’s history, sover-
eign immunity became a point of contention for individuals study-
ing the values of constitutionalism.19
Constitutionalism requires a Government’s commitment to
protecting the fundamental rights of citizens.20  Scholars resisting
sovereign immunity argue this commitment is in obvious tension
with sovereign immunity’s protection to the Government from pri-
vate tort lawsuits.21  “ [I]f the ‘essence of civil liberty’ is that the law
provide remedies for violations of rights, immunizing Government
from ordinary remedies is in considerable tension with all but the
most formalist understandings of law and rights.”22  On the other
hand, those supporting sovereign immunity argue a democracy
should hesitate to apply ordinary court remedies to hold the Gov-
ernment accountable to private citizens.23
2. The Federal Tort Claims Act
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)24 in
1946.25  The FTCA broke the protective shield of sovereign immu-
nity by granting private citizens the right to sue the U.S. Govern-
ment in federal court for tort injuries.26  The FTCA defines an
“employee of the Government” to include officers or employees of
any federal agency, members of the U.S. military or naval forces,
members of the National Guard, persons acting on behalf of a fed-
eral agency, and any officer or employee of a federal public de-
fender organization.27
Because Congress did not intend for the FTCA to be a sweep-
ing grant of all lawsuits against the Government, lawmakers created
a separate statute listing exceptions to the Government’s liability
under the FTCA.28  While the FTCA’s exceptions reveal Congress’s
effort to limit certain claims, this statute nevertheless opened the
door for private citizens—including members of the armed forces—
18. See id.
19. See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immu-





24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2019).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. § 2671.
28. See id. § 2680.
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to sue the federal Government.29  Of particular importance is the
legislature’s decision to omit members of the military from the
FTCA’s list of individuals barred from suing the Government.30
B. The Feres Doctrine
1. Creation of the Feres Doctrine’s “Incident to Military Service”
Test
The Feres doctrine’s evolution dates back to 1949 when the Su-
preme Court examined the circumstances in which a service mem-
ber could sue the Government under the FTCA.31  In Brooks v.
United States,32 an army vehicle struck a civilian vehicle while trav-
eling at night.33  Of the three men in the civilian vehicle, two were
members of the armed forces who had been performing a non-mili-
tary activity at the time of the accident.34  One service member
passed away, and the others survived with lasting injuries as a result
of the accident.35  The surviving service member, along with the es-
tate of the deceased, brought a negligence lawsuit against the U.S.
Government.36  The Government moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ suit,
arguing that the plaintiffs could not recover under the FTCA be-
cause of their status as members of the armed forces at the time of
the accident.37
Examining the legislative history, language, and framework of
the FTCA, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs—find-
ing their legal claim to be well founded.38  The Supreme Court al-
lowed the plaintiffs’ FTCA suit despite their status as members of
the armed forces, stating, “[We] are dealing with an accident which
had nothing to do with [plaintiffs’] army careers, injuries not caused
by their service except in the sense that all human events depend
upon what has already transpired.”39  The Supreme Court further
supported its decision by noting that the FTCA contained numer-
29. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (allowing plain-
tiffs to recover damages for injuries caused by the federal Government’s
negligence).
30. Tara Willke, Comment, Military Mothers and Claims Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for Injuries that Occur Pre-Birth, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 160,
161 (2016).
31. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
32. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
33. See id. at 50.
34. See id. at 52.
35. See id. at 50.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 54.
39. Id. at 52.
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ous exceptions, none of which exclusively bar a plaintiff’s claim by
virtue of being in the military.40
In 1950, the Supreme Court revisited the circumstances under
which members of the armed forces could file FTCA suit against
the Government.41  In Feres v. United States,42 the Supreme Court
considered three cases within one cohesive opinion.43  The first case
involved the death of an active duty service member resulting from
a fire erupting in the army barracks.44  The second and third cases
involved two active duty service members who received inadequate
medical treatment by military staff members.45  Because each case
involved plaintiffs sustaining injuries while on active duty in the
armed forces, the Supreme Court considered the cases as one.46
Noting that the three factual scenarios within Feres were
wholly different than the factual scenario in Brooks, the Supreme
Court denied plaintiffs any relief under the FTCA.47  The Supreme
Court noted one key distinction between the plaintiffs in Feres and
Brooks.48  While the Brooks plaintiffs were on furlough from their
military service and performing a personal task, the Feres plaintiffs
were injured during the performance of military tasks on an active
duty military status.49  The Supreme Court  concluded that the
Government is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to service
members when their “injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to [military] service.”50
The Supreme Court listed two main rationales supporting its
decision to bar FTCA lawsuits for a service member’s injuries oc-
curring “incident to military service.”51  First, the Supreme Court
expressed its desire not to intrude on the distinctively federal rela-
tionship between members of the armed forces and the Govern-
ment.52  Next, the Court discussed the already existing and vast
statutory compensation schemes for injured service members.53
40. See id. at 51.
41. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950) (establishing the Su-
preme Court’s “incident to military service” test).
42. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
43. Id. at 136.
44. Id. at 136–37.
45. Id. at 137.
46. Id. at 138.
47. Id. at 138, 146.
48. Id. at 146.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 139–46.
52. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
53. See id. at 144–45. Unlike the FTCA, these statutory compensation
schemes impose no litigation requirement on a service member to receive benefits.
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2. Rationales Supporting the Creation of the Feres Doctrine
a. The Distinctively Federal Relationship Between the
Government and the Armed Forces
In Feres, the Supreme Court noted its desire not to interfere
with the unique, distinctively federal relationship between the
members of the armed forces and the federal Government.54  Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court recognized that no federal remedy has
ever existed to explicitly grant service members the right to recover
from the Government.55  The Feres Court viewed this unique rela-
tionship—combined with the lack of an already existing federal
remedy to service members—as a blockade to members of the
armed forces using the FTCA to recover for injuries against the
Government.56
In United States v. Johnson,57 the Supreme Court provided a
critical examination of the rationales supporting the Feres doctrine,
including the federal relationship between members of the armed
forces and the Government.58  The Supreme Court explained that
the unique “federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
when a service member is performing activities incident to his fed-
eral service.”59  By virtue of performing a military function in di-
verse parts of the country, those service members subject
themselves to a “significant risk of accidents and injuries.”60  Al-
lowing FTCA suits would undermine the unique relationship ser-
vice members have with their country, categorized by “mandates of
command and order, discipline and responsibility, a commitment to
country, and a respect for rules [and] regulations.”61
b. The Existence of Separate Statutory Compensation Schemes
for Service Members
In Feres, the Supreme Court noted the legislature created the
FTCA for the primary purpose of extending a judicial remedy to
See id. at 145.  A soldier simply needs to successfully file with the Veterans’ Ad-
ministration to be compensated for injuries. See id.  For a comprehensive discus-
sion of these statutes, see generally Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly
Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 454–57 (2010).
54. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
55. See id. at 144.
56. See id. at 143–44.
57. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
58. See id. at 689.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States 430 U.S.
666, 672 (1977)).
61. Popper, supra note 2, at 1520.
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those citizens who had been without one.62  The Supreme Court
took special notice of service members already having access to re-
imbursement for injuries, stating, “This Court, in deciding claims
for wrongs incident to service under the Tort Claims Act, cannot
escape attributing some bearing upon it to enactments by Congress
which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensa-
tion for injuries or death of those in armed services.”63  The Su-
preme Court did not accept that Congress would have provided
service members with such a comprehensive system of statutory
benefits while at the same time contemplating recovery for service-
related injuries under the FTCA.64  Allowing service members to
recover under the FTCA and also receive statutory compensation
would permit dual recovery, a legal concept in which the Court did
not favor.65
Further, some scholars argue that service members can benefit
more from recovering under these statutory compensation schemes
than attempting to recover under the FTCA.66  The Veteran’s Ben-
efit Act (VBA)67 is the main statutory compensation scheme dis-
cussed in military FTCA lawsuits.68  Unlike the FTCA, the VBA
provides “no fault” compensation that requires no litigation or obli-
gation upon the service member to prove fault of the Govern-
ment.69  Instead, a service member—or the family member of a
deceased service member—must simply fit the statutory require-
ments to receive compensation.70  In addition to the ease of receiv-
ing VBA benefits, the amount of compensation veterans receive is
extremely favorable.71  These compensation schemes completely
cover any of the service member’s necessary medical care and pro-
vide “generous insurance, retirement, and other general benefits”
that extend beyond tort recovery from the Government.72
62. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
63. Id. at 144.
64. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690.
65. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
66. See Popper, supra note 2, at 1520.
67. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1163 (1986).
68. See Johnson, 340 U.S. at 685 n.2.
69. See id.; Popper, supra note 2, at 1520.
70. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 145 (stating the statutory compensation system re-
quires no litigation).
71. See id.
72. See Popper, supra note 2, at 1520.
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c. The Court’s Desire to Avoid Interference with Military
Discipline and Effectiveness
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court added a third
rationale supporting Feres’s creation that relates to military effec-
tiveness.73  Compliance with the military’s rules, demands, disci-
pline, chain of command, and teachings is vitally important to
building an effective and lasting armed forces.74  Upon joining the
armed forces, men and women shed their civilian statuses and take
a vow to meet the demands of discipline and duty to their country.75
The Supreme Court has relied heavily on this notion of “military
discipline” to justify the bar of military FTCA suits under the Feres
doctrine.76
In Johnson, the Supreme Court barred a service member’s
FTCA lawsuit because permitting military claims “would involve
the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military
discipline and effectiveness.”77  The Court recognized that the mili-
tary is a “specialized society” where obedience, community, and
commitment are paramount to a unit’s success.78  In essence, the
Court feared an FTCA suit would require military personnel to tes-
tify in a court of law to their decisions in the midst of combat, stat-
ing, “ [A] suit based upon a service-related activity necessarily
implicates the military judgements and decisions that are inextrica-
bly intertwined with the conduct of a military mission.”79  Such a
requirement would potentially undermine the commitment essen-
tial to having an effective and lasting armed forces.80
C. Current Problems with the Feres Doctrine
1. The Feres Doctrine Endures Widespread Criticism
a. Early Criticism from the Supreme Court
Since 1987, the Feres doctrine has endured widespread criti-
cism from Supreme Court Justices.81  In Johnson, Justice Antonin
Scalia discussed the problems with the Feres doctrine in a dissenting
73. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690.
74. Popper, supra note 2, at 1522.
75. See Jeffrey A. Critchlow, Note, Propping Open the Courthouse Door: Why
Service Members Should Be Able to Bring Sexual Harassment Suits Under the Feres
Doctrine, 104 IOWA L. REV. 856, 862 (2019).
76. See id.
77. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52,
59 (1985)).
78. See id. at 690–91.
79. Id. at 691.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 692–703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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opinion joined by Justices William Brennan, John Marshall, and
John Paul Stevens.82  In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated, “Feres was
wrongly decided and heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost uni-
versal criticism’ it has received.”83  Justice Scalia further presented
his view discussing why the Supreme Court majority’s rationaliza-
tions of Feres are weak upon a critical examination.84
While statutory compensation schemes do provide relief to in-
jured service members, that relief can be terminated if a service
member does not fit the qualifications of the statute.85  Further, Jus-
tice Scalia questioned the Supreme Court majority’s inconsistent ra-
tionale of disallowing dual recovery.86  Specifically, Justice Scalia
pointed to the Supreme Court’s allowance of dual recovery—under
both the VBA and the FTCA—in the past.87  For example, the
Brooks Court allowed the plaintiffs to recover both under the
FTCA and the VBA.88
Further, Justice Scalia examined why the Supreme Court ma-
jority’s rationale of “protecting military discipline” is weak when
critically examined.89  Justice Scalia stated,
To the extent that reading the FTCA as it is written will require
civilian courts to examine military decisionmaking and thus influ-
ence military discipline, it is outlandish to consider that result
“outlandish” . . . .  If [plaintiff’s] helicopter had crashed into a
civilian’s home, the homeowner could have brought an FTCA
suit that would have invaded the sanctity of military decision-
making no less than [plaintiff’s].90
After examining the shortcomings related to the Feres doc-
trine’s rationales, Justice Scalia discussed the moral wrongfulness
behind the doctrine’s bar to service members’ recovery under the
FTCA.91  If Johnson’s death had occurred while he flew a commer-
cial, civilian plane, his family members could have recovered for the
loss of their father and husband.92  However, because Johnson de-
voted his life to serving his country in the armed forces, the Su-
82. See id.
83. Id. at 700.
84. See id. at 697–702.
85. See id. at 698.
86. See id. at 697.
87. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 697.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 700.
90. .Id.
91. See id. at 703.
92. Id.
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preme Court denied his family justice by barring suit under the
FTCA.93
b. Modern Criticism from the Supreme Court
In Daniel v. United States,94 the Supreme Court again had the
opportunity to discuss the shortcomings of the Feres doctrine.95
Without providing any rationale behind the decision, the Supreme
Court declined to hear Daniel’s argument in favor of overturning
Feres.96  Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, JUSTICE
CLARENCE THOMAS revealed his position on the Feres doctrine in
his dissenting opinion.97
In his dissenting opinion of Daniel, JUSTICE THOMAS discussed
another recent case—Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries98— in
which two veterans developed cancer from asbestos exposure
caused by the navy’s negligence.99  Although the manufacturer de-
livered equipment to the navy without asbestos, the navy added the
asbestos to the equipment after delivery.100  Because the service
members knew they would be denied recovery under the FTCA,
the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers instead.101  “[T]he Supreme
Court then twisted traditional tort principals to afford [plaintiffs]
the possibility of relief” by allowing them to sue a party not directly
responsible for the injury.102
In the closing paragraph of his dissenting opinion, JUSTICE
THOMAS stated his distaste for the Feres doctrine by asserting,
“Such unfortunate repercussions—denial of relief to military per-
sonnel and distortions of other areas of law to compensate—will
continue to ripple through our jurisprudence as long as the Court
refuses to reconsider Feres.”103  The longstanding issues with the
Feres doctrine have stemmed from the inconsistent methods in
which the Circuit Courts and District Courts have defined Feres’s
“incident to military service” test.104
93. Id.
94. Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713 (2019).
95. See id. at 1713.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1713–14 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
98. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019).
99. Daniel, 139 S. Ct. at 1713 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1714.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Popper, supra note 2, at 1497.
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2. Circuit Courts Are Struggling to Define Feres’s “Incident to
Military Service” Test
Considering the current Feres environment, scholars reason the
main problem with the doctrine is the Circuit Courts’ “wistful and
unenthusiastic” approach to examining military FTCA cases.105
Rather than interpreting Feres’s “incident to military service” test
on a case-by-case basis, the Circuit Courts interpret Feres as a
broad bar of all FTCA suits brought by military personnel.106  Al-
though the Circuit Courts publicly denounce Feres, the courts still
apply the doctrine as binding precedent providing for a blanket
waiver of all military FTCA claims—not just those injuries occur-
ring “incident to military service.”107  The most common cases of
injustice under Feres are lawsuits against the Government pertain-
ing to medical malpractice and sexual harassment within the mili-
tary.108  A closer examination of various Circuit Court and District
Court case law will exemplify the current problem with the inter-
pretation of Feres.
The first example of the D.C. Circuit’s constrained application
of Feres’s “incident to military service” test is Doe v. Hagenbeck.109
While attending West Point Military Academy, a fellow West Point
cadet sexually assaulted the plaintiff, Jane Doe.110  The assault took
place after hours and against the regulations of West Point Military
Academy.111  Doe filed suit against the two military officers in
charge of administration, training cadets, and overseeing the “Sex-
ual Assault Review Board.”112
Although this assault occurred after hours, against military reg-
ulation, and not during any military training exercise, the D.C. Cir-
cuit concluded plaintiff’s injury occurred “incident to military
105. See id. at 1537.
106. See id. at 1497.
107. See id. at 1537. In Costo v. United States, the court states,
We apply the Feres doctrine here without relish.  Nor are we the first to
reluctantly reach such a conclusion under the doctrine.  Rather, in deter-
mining the suit to be barred, we join the many panels of this Court that
have criticized the inequitable extension of this doctrine to a range of
situations that seem far removed from the doctrine’s original purpose.
Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
108. See Popper, supra note 2, at 1505–6.
109. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(denying a service mem-
ber plaintiff recovery from those tasked to oversee cadets based on Feres’s “inci-
dent to military service” test).
110. Id. at 39.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 38.
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service.”113  The D.C. Circuit based the decision to bar Doe from
recovering against her supervisors on her active duty status.114  Fur-
ther, the D.C. Circuit explained that allowing Doe recovery would
force the court to require military leaders to testify and “convince a
civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and discipli-
nary decisions.”115 Doe is just one example of many sexual assault
victims denied FTCA recovery as a result of the court applying an
overly broad definition of Feres’s “incident to military service”
test.116
Another example of a Circuit Court broadly applying Feres’s
“incident to military service test” is Ortiz v. United States,117 de-
cided by the Second Circuit.118 Active duty Air Force Captain
Heather Ortiz gave birth to her son at Evans Army Community
Hospital.119  The primary patients of Evans Army Community Hos-
pital—owned and operated by the military—are service members
and their families.120  During Ortiz’s cesarean section, the hospital
staff negligently administered her drugs, deprived herself and her
newborn baby of oxygen, and caused severe injuries to Ortiz’s new-
born child.121  Ortiz’s husband filed an FTCA suit against the Gov-
ernment in an attempt to receive compensation for the child’s
injuries and long-term medical care.122
Although the Second Circuit noted the “confusion and lack of
uniform standards” surrounding the Feres doctrine, the court reluc-
tantly denied Ortiz’s husband FTCA relief for her newborn child’s
injuries and care.123  The basis of this decision fell solely on the fact
that the injuries occurred at a hospital primarily serving military
members and their families.124  Within the Second Circuit’s opinion,
the court gave an extensive background of the Feres doctrine’s in-
consistencies.125  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit denied Ortiz
113. See id. at 49.
114. See id. at 47, 49.
115. Id. at 48 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)).
116. See, e.g., Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 2013); Klay v.
Penetta, 758 F.3d 369, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (denying service member plaintiff
FTCA recovery for injuries occurring from a sexual assault).
117. Ortiz v. United States, 786 F.3d 817 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying a service
member plaintiff from receiving FTCA recovery to care for her newborn child
after army medical staff negligently treated the child).
118. See id.




123. See id. at 822–23.
124. See id. at 823.
125. See id. at 822–23.
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FTCA relief and accepted that the court is constrained by Feres’s
“incident to military service test.”126
Similar to Ortiz, Glaude v. United States127 is another medical
malpractice case exemplifying a court’s denial of relief to a service
member after a military hospital negligently treated her.128  Captain
Joann Glaude sustained injuries after a sting ray stung her foot
while vacationing in Florida.129  As a member of the armed forces,
the nearby Tyndall Air Force Base permitted Glaude to receive
treatment at the base’s medical center.130  After the Tyndall Air
Force Base provided Glaude with negligent medical treatment, she
sustained further injuries.131  Glaude attempted to sue the Govern-
ment under FTCA, but the District Court for the Northern District
of Florida barred Glaude’s lawsuit because her injury occurred “in-
cident to military service.”132
Although the court recognized that Glaude’s injuries in no way
arose out of any combat or military-conducted training activity, the
court found great importance in the fact that Glaude’s ability to
receive treatment at the Tyndall Air Force Base took place “by vir-
tue of her military status.”133  In making this decision, the court
supported the notion that Feres’s “incident to military service” test
includes injuries that did not directly arise out of a service mem-
ber’s duty to the military in a combative sense.134  Rather, a service
member could be denied recovery simply because that soldier re-
ceived medical care at a military facility.135
126. See id.
127. Glaude v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (denying a
service member plaintiff FTCA recovery after army medical staff negligently
treated her).
128. See id. at 1331.
129. Id. at 1328.
130. Id.
131. See id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Recent Attempts to Solve Feres’s Inadequacies and Grant
Service Members More Opportunity for Recovery
1. The Supreme Court’s refusal to reconsider Feres in Daniel v.
United States
Daniel v. United States is the most recent attempt to overturn
the lasting impact of the Feres doctrine in the Supreme Court.136 In
Daniel, the spouse of Navy Lieutenant Rebekah Daniel attempted
to sue the Government to recover for his wife’s death.137  Rebekah
Daniel passed away during childbirth when a complication arose
due to the negligence of the military hospital staff.138  The District
Court for the Western District of Washington determined that the
Feres doctrine barred the suit because Daniel’s injuries occurred
“incident to her military service.”139  Upon petition to the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff asked the Court to reconsider the Feres doctrine
in the modern era.140  Although JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS and
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg both voiced their desire to grant certi-
orari and consider Daniel, the majority declined to hear the case on
May 20, 2019.141
Because the Supreme Court denied consideration of Daniel,
national court reporters inferred this decision signified the Court’s
handing off of Feres’s issues to Congress.142  Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court’s decision not to hear Daniel imposes on Congress the
duty to solve the discrepancies associated with the Feres doctrine.143
Natalie Khawam, an attorney arguing in support of the discontinua-
tion of the Feres doctrine in the modern era, stated, “Congress now
has the opportunity to fix this injustice.  We need to stand up and
ask Congress to support our troops.”144
2. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2020
In 2019, Congress increased its efforts to solve the Feres doc-
trine’s deficiencies, beginning with introducing the Sergeant First






142. See Leo Shane III, Supreme Court Rejects Bid to Overturn Prohibition on
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Class (SFC) Richard Stayskal Military Medical Accountability Act
of 2019 (MMAA).145  SFC Richard Stayskal is an army special
forces solider currently battling the final stages of lung cancer.146
The progression and severity of Stayskal’s cancer resulted from the
failure of army medical staff to alert him of a tumor, despite the
tumor appearing on medical scans.147  By the time private practi-
tioners alerted Stayskal of his cancer, the tumor had already
reached a stage four, terminal prognosis.148  Because of the Feres
doctrine, a court of law will not allow Stayskal’s family to recover
under the FTCA for the military’s negligent treatment of
Stayskal.149
Congresswoman Jackie Speier, the sponsor of the MMAA, ar-
gued for the passage of this act to combat 70 years of injustice to
service members.150 The MMAA aimed to provide recovery to ser-
vice members—or the family of service members—injured by the
negligent actions of military medical staff in a noncombative set-
ting.151  While noting that the Feres doctrine is generally outdated,
Congresswoman Speier focused on overriding Feres in the specific
area of medical malpractice.152
In 2020, Congress took active steps toward increasing a service
member’s chances of recovery when the 2019 National Defense Au-
thorization Act(NDAA)153 adopted portions of the MMAA.154  On
December 20, 2019, President Donald J. Trump signed the NDAA,
enacting the act as law to take effect in the upcoming year.155
NDAA Section 729 contains an updated version of the MMAA,
allowing service members and their families to file Department of
Defense (DOD) claims to receive compensation for injuries arising
out of a negligent act in the performance of medical care at a mili-
tary medical treatment facility.156
145. Sergeant First Class Richard Stayskal Military Medical Accountability
Act of 2019, H.R. 2422, 116th Cong. (2019).








153. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, S. 1790, 116th
Cong. (2020).
154. See id.
155. See id. § 729.
156. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-3\DIK304.txt unknown Seq: 18  6-MAY-21 15:05
762 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:745
While reporters consider the passage of Section 729 within the
NDAA a victory for service members, this Act falls short of being
deemed a perfect solution.157  First, skeptics acknowledge that the
passage of this Act does not overturn Feres’s precedent.158  Feres’s
“incident to military service” test continues to govern whether a
court can allow a service member to sue the Government for inju-
ries occurring during military service.159  Further, this exemption
applies only to the military’s medical malpractice in non-combative
settings.160  Finally, the specificity of the Act still fails to provide all
service members—including sexual assault survivors—with a path
to justice and relief.161
Another problem with the NDAA’s medical malpractice ex-
ception is the Act’s grant of power to the DOD, giving the Depart-
ment the sole authority to establish the standards for judging the
merits of each claim and the damages resulting from each claim.162
If the DOD runs the claims process, the Department could act in its
own self-interest by creating strict standards to deny justice to many
victims.163  Further, the DOD needs to provide compensation to
victims only if their damages result in injuries under $100,000.164  If
a service member’s injuries result in damages more than $100,000,
the recovery process is further complicated because the DOD will
outsource the service member’s claim to the Department of Trea-
sury for compensation.165  While Section 729 is considered a victory
for service members suffering from medical malpractice by military
doctors, the NDAA is far from perfect to fix all of Feres’s
discrepancies.166
3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach to Defining Feres’s “Incident
to Military Service” Test
Although many of the aforementioned Circuit Courts broadly
interpret Feres’s “incident to military service test” as a blanket
157. See Richard A. Custin, Congress Grants Military Members Partial Vic-






162. See Patricia Kime, A Dent to Feres: Troops to Be Able to File Claims—
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waiver of all military FTCA claims, the Eleventh Circuit has crafted
an effective test to analyze military FTCA suits.167  In Pierce v.
United States,168 the Eleventh Circuit adopted a three-factor balanc-
ing test to examine whether a service member’s injury occurred “in-
cident to military service” for the purpose of Feres.169  Under the
three-factor balancing test, the court considers 1) the service mem-
ber’s duty status, 2) the location of the service member’s injury, and
3) the service member’s activity at the time of the injury.170  After
weighing the three factors, the court should determine whether the
injury occurred “incident to military service based on the totality of
the circumstances.”171  While no factor is dispositive, the Eleventh
Circuit suggests the most important factor to consider in this analy-
sis is the service member’s activity at the time of injury.172
When examining the duty status of a service member, Pierce
requires a court look to whether the military granted the service
member a “furlough” or “pass” at the time of the injury.173  If a
service member receives permission to leave his or her post, exer-
cises the right to be absent from his or her regular duties, and has
“discretionary time off,” this factor will weigh in favor of a court
finding the service member’s injuries did not occur “incident to mil-
itary service.”174  If, however, the service member is active duty and
must still attend to his or her daily military tasks, this factor will
weigh in favor of a court concluding the injury occurred “incident
to military service.”175
Further, the site of an injury can inform whether the injury oc-
curred “incident to military service.”176  If the service member’s in-
jury occurs on a military base or within military owned property,
the likelihood that the service member’s injury arose during a mili-
tary activity is high.177  If the injury occurred off the military base,
167. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980)
(following a three-factor analysis to examine military FTCA claims under Feres’s
“incident to service” test).
168. Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987) (allowing a service
member plaintiff to recover for injuries that did not occur “incident to military
service”).
169. See id. at 352.
170. Id. at 353.
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this factor weighs in favor of a court concluding the service mem-
ber’s injuries did not occur “incident to military service.”178
Finally, the service member’s activity at the time of the injury
is the most dispositive factor in determining whether the soldier’s
injury occurred “incident to military service.”179  In Pierce, an army
vehicle struck plaintiff while he engaged in the personal activities of
eating lunch and visiting a pawn shop.180  The Government argued
plaintiff’s activities were “proximately” related to military duties
because those duties are part of everyday life as a soldier.181
Rejecting the Government’s argument that the court must con-
sider every activity in the life of a soldier a military activity under
Feres, the Eleventh Circuit chose to adopt a new standard for defin-
ing a “military activity.”182  This standard examines whether the
plaintiff’s injury occurred while he was directly subject to the mili-
tary’s control, under the compulsion of military orders, or perform-
ing a military mission.183  The court did not view pawning a camera,
eating lunch, or operating a civilian vehicle as activities performed
under the compulsion of military orders or during a military mis-
sion.184  Overall, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s injuries did
not occur “incident to military service,” allowing him to recover
under the FTCA.185  In recent years, the Eleventh Circuit has fol-
lowed Pierce’s three-factor balancing test to determine whether a
service member’s injuries occur “incident to military service.”186
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Overturn Feres
Feres is a “double-edged sword.”  While many scholars argue
the Supreme Court should completely abandon the doctrine, this
approach would prove extremely difficult.187  Although Feres re-
ceives consistent criticism, the Court has accepted and ratified this
doctrine for the past 60 years.188  If the Supreme Court took such a
severe approach as to completely overturn Feres, the Court would
be abandoning over 60 years of legislative interpretation related to
178. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353.







186. See, e.g., Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1061 (11th Cir. 1999)
(allowing recovery for a service member killed while returning from a civilian soc-
cer game).
187. See Figley, supra note 53, at 473.
188. See id.
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the doctrine.189  Although the Supreme Court has the authority to
overturn Feres, this approach could cause additional harm by forc-
ing the Court to start over in creating precedent dictating when a
service member will have a successful FTCA suit.190
Further, the Supreme Court should not overturn Feres because
the military remains a distinctively federal force in the modern
era.191  Finally,  service members still receive vast benefits from the
VBA for injuries occurring during their military service.192  With
the addition of the NDAA Section 729 allowing citizens to sue the
military for medical malpractice, service members enjoy even more
access to compensation schemes now than they did upon Feres’s
creation.193  It is unlikely the Supreme Court will ever elect to com-
pletely overturn the Feres doctrine.194
C. The Supreme Court Should Provide a Clear, Consistent
Definition of “Incident to Military Service”
The Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s test to
defining “incident to military service” for military FTCA lawsuits.
While no one solution may solve all of Feres shortcomings, the
Eleventh Circuit has crafted an effective test to define “incident to
military service.”195  The test allows service members to sue the
Government under the FTCA for injuries—caused by the mili-
tary—that did not occur under military orders or compulsion.196
The Eleventh Circuit’s test supports the Supreme Court’s original
aspirations for the treatment of military FTCA claims established
via Brooks in 1950.197  The Brooks Court allowed the military plain-
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 452.
192. See id. at 454.
193. See Kime, supra note 162.
194. See Joan M. Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A Critique of the Presumption
of Injustice, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 62 (1987).
195. See Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349, 353 (11th Cir. 1987).
196. See supra Section III.A.3 (describing the Eleventh Circuit’s three-factor
balancing test to define “incident to military service”).
197. See Lester S. Jayson & Robert C. Longstreth, Claims Involving Members
of the Armed Forces: Brooks Doctrine Held Applicable, in HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS 1 (83rd ed. 2019).
In cases in which the courts have held the Brooks doctrine controlling,
rather than the Feres doctrine, the opinions generally have emphasized,
first, that at the time of the accident the claimant-serviceman was on
leave or furlough or pass; second, that the accident occurred away from
the military base where he was stationed; and third, that at the time of the
accident he was not under compulsion of military orders or performance
any military mission or directly subject to military control.
Id.
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tiffs to recover under the FTCA when an army vehicle struck their
civilian vehicle.198  Paramount to the Supreme Court’s analysis, the
army vehicle struck furloughed service members performing civil-
ian tasks.199  The Court granted recovery by finding the plaintiffs’
injuries did not occur by virtue of their status in the military, stat-
ing, “[W]e are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do
with [plaintiffs’] army careers, injuries not caused by their service
except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has
already transpired.”200
IV. CONCLUSION
Although courts have applied the Feres doctrine for the past 60
years, Feres’s “incident to military service” test does not function as
originally intended.201  Rather than examining each case on a fac-
tual basis as the Court did in Brooks, many Circuit Courts apply
Feres as a blanket waiver to bar all service members from suing the
Government in FTCA actions.202  Under this broad interpretation
of Feres, the judicial system has denied justice to numerous injured
service members.203
While the passage of the NDAA certainly is a victory for those
service members injured due to the medical malpractice of military
doctors, this exception does not provide any further recovery under
Feres for victims of sexual assault.204  To provide all service mem-
bers with fair access to recovery, the Supreme Court should adopt
the Eleventh Circuit’s three-factor balancing test as binding prece-
dent for all of the lower courts to apply.205  Adopting the Eleventh
Circuit’s test will ensure that courts approach Feres’s “incident to
military service” test by conducting a factual analysis of each case
before the court.206  Further, this test will make certain that courts
can deny a service member recovery under Feres only if the service
member’s injuries occurred during a true military activity.207
198. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 54 (1950).
199. Id. at 50.
200. Id. at 53.
201. See supra Section II.C.
202. See supra Section II.C.
203. See supra Section II.C.
204. See supra Section III.A.2.
205. See supra Section III.C.
206. See supra Section III.C.
207. See supra Section III.C.
